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RECENT DECISIONS
TRADE REGULATION - ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT - PRICE DISCRIMINATION -
"PREMIUM" AND NON-"PREMIUM" PRODUCTS ARE OF UNLIKE "GnADE" UNDER SEC-
TION 2(a). - Since about 1938, the Borden Company has been selling chemically
identical quantities of evaporated milk under its own brand name and under private
labels. The Borden brand, like the brands of its major national competitors, has
been sold nationwide on a uniform delivered-price basis. The private-label milk
has been sold on an f.o.b. plant basis, at a price determined by a cost-plus formula
by which Borden adds a margin of profit to the actual cost of production at the
particular plants from which the milk is shipped. This price has varied from plant
to plant, and from month to month at each plant, but it has always been substan-
tially lower than the price for the Borden brand.
Prior to 1956, only four of the nine Borden plants were engaged in packing
the evaporated milk under private labels. In 1956 and 1957, Borden expanded its
private-label operations in a number of its plants which had previously packed
only the Borden brand, including those located in Lewisburg, Tennessee and Chester,
South Carolina. This expansion was motivated by the requests of customers of,
another packer who had gone out of business. The private-label milk was sold
thereafter to these customers and to others who requested it; Borden made no
general offers, and solicited no orders.
As a result of its new operations in Tennessee and South Carolina, various
wholesalers and retailers who formerly purchased private-label milk from other
packers began to shift their business to Borden. There is some evidence that this
milk may not have been available to all customers on equal terms, and that sales
of Borden's private-label milk at the retail level tended to interfere with the retailers'
efforts to market the Borden brand. The Federal Trade Commission claimed that
the price differentials maintained between the Borden brand and private-label
brands constituted a "price discrimination" among products of "like grade and
quality" under the Robinson-Patman Act, and issued a complaint alleging primary-
and secondary-line injury to competition.1
In the proceedings before the Commission, Borden denied the substantial like-
lihood of injury to either line of competition,2 and also offered a cost justification
for its pricing differentials. The Hearing Examiner agreed with its contentions on
these points, but the Commission's rulings were adverse.3 Petitioning the Fifth
Circuit to set aside the Commission's order, Borden renewed these contentions, and
pressed urgently the jurisdictional contention that the quantities of milk sold under
different labels were not of like grade and quality. The Borden brand milk was a
"premium" product, consistently commanding a higher price from the consuming
public than less well-known brands. It was consequently of a "grade" unlike that
of the private-label milk. The Commission countered with various authorities,
purportedly to the effect that brand-name distinctions may play no part in the
determination of a commodity's statutory "grade." The Court granted the petition,
1 It shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . .where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ...
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
2 Actual injury to competition need not be proven. Mid-South Distrib. v. FTC, 287
F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961). See also Judge Whit-
taker's discussion in Moog Indus., Inc., v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 51 (8th Cir. 1956), af'd, 355
U.S. 411 (1958).
3 The Borden Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) 16191 (FTC, Nov. 28,
1962).
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and unanimously held that the Borden and private brands were not of "like grade
and quality" within the meaning of the act. Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133
(5th Cir. 1964).
The issue presented by the Borden case is whether the statutory "grade" of a
commodity may be altered solely by the public demand for it under a particular
label or brand name.
That brand names alone, irrespective of their commerical significance, will not
distinguish commodities in grade, is settled beyond dispute. A proposal during the
debates over the Robinson-Patman amendments to limit the price discrimination
provisions to "commodities of like grade and quality and brands" was vigorously
denounced and finally rejected.4
On the question involved here, however, the law is less clear. The Commission
has repeatedly held, on facts similar to those of the Borden case, that goods, which
are physically the same in all respects except for their labels, are goods of like grade
and quality. Some of these cases have involved distributions of "name"-brand
and private label goods, such as tires5 and footwear,6 to wholesalers and retailers.
Page Dairy Co.7 involved a price discrimination at the retail level, where one cent
more per quart was charged for "Vitamin D Homogenized" milk than for the same
milk without the label. The Borden Court distinguishes these precedents, however,
as not involving the express contention that Borden raises, stating:
In none of those cases was there any showing that the purchasers pay-
ing the higher prices had received brand-name products which readily
commanded a premium price in the market, while the purchasers paying
the lower prices did not. The brand names were not shown to have any
effect on the ultimate price the products could command. Here the Borden
label was clearly of commercial significance. 8
It might well be that "Goodyear" and "U.S. Royal" tires, "U.S. Rubber" footwear
and "Vitamin D Homogenized" milk all commanded higher prices from the public
than they would have if sold under other labels. Still, no evidence had been adduced
to show that fact at the jurisdictional level to support an argument that these were
products to which section 2(a) could not apply. Thus the Court regards the
Commission's precedents as merely illustrative of the basic proposition that brand
names alone cannot make a difference of grade.9
4 Mr. Teegarden, draftsman of the statute, called the proposal a "specious suggestion
that would destroy entirely the efficacy of the bill against large buyers." Hearings Before theSubcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act,
74th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 10, pt. 2, at 469 (1936).
On the question here, the legislative history is uncertain. Mr. Teegarden's criticism of the
"and brands" proposal was that "[s]o amended, the bill would impose no limitations whatever
upon price differentials, except as between purchasers of the same brand." Ibid. (Emphasis
added.) While he did not address himself to the question of "demonstrably preferred" brands,
he did say that the bill left manufacturers "free to put up their products under private brands,"
mentioning only the caveat that these brands must be available to all comers on equal terms.
Ibid.
On the other hand, Representative Patman stated that manufacturers could not make
certain brands of goods available to particular chain stores unless independents could buy goods
of the same quality at the same price, regardless of the brand names. 80 CONO. REc. 8115
(1936) (remarks of Representatives Patman and Taylor).
5 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), was a pre-Robinson-Patman
case under the essentially similar language of the Clayton Act; there, Goodyear sold tires to
Sears, Roebuck & Co., for resale under the Sears brands, at prices lower than it charged to
independent dealers for resale under the Goodyear brand. The facts were substantially the same
in United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939).
6 In United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950), the company had given varying
quantity discounts on its rubber and canvas shoes and other footwear, which was sold under
a variety of the company's own brand names, and under private brands. Accord, Hood Rubber
Co., 46 F.T.C. 1015 (1949).
7 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953).
8 339 F.2d at 137.
9 The Commission precedent would be of some weight if we were here
holding that the mere affixing of different labels to physically identical
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There is a division of opinion among the commentators who have dealt with
this question. A majority of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws recommended the "promotional" factors inherent in brand
names not be considered in the jurisdictional inquiry.'0 The minority urged that
"significant consumer preferences" for one product over another should be evaluated
as a measure of its "grade."'" Rowe supports the minority's view:
Considerations of "quality" aside, the requirement of "like grade," whose
real import was never legislatively clarified, appears sufficiently plastic to
take account of any other commercially significant distinctions - whether
physical or promotional differentiations affecting market value. "Like
grade" is thus readily equated with "commercial fungibility."
So construed, the statutory condition of "like grade" would exempt
those non-"fungible" goods differentiated significantly in physical com-
ponents or promotional appeal.' 2
It is said that the purpose of the "like grade and quality" jurisdictional test is
to foreclose the "emasculation" of section 2(a) by the making of "artificial dis-
tinctions" among products which are otherwise commercially comparable.' 3 It is
noteworthy that the test is "like" grade; identity of grade is not required. The
question is whether the goods are "sufficiently comparable for price regulation."'14
Even if the public preference for Borden brand milk over the same milk under
another label may be largely a matter of promotional artifice, the distinction is
nonetheless of competitive significance. This has been repeatedly recognized by
the Commission and the courts in cases involving defenses of price differentials
under section 2(b),15 as good faith efforts to meet competition. The representative
case of Anheuser-Busch, Inc.16 involved the lowering of Budweiser beer prices in
the St. Louis area to equal those of its local competitors. Because the company
maintained a "premium" price level for Budweiser in more than 80% of its
markets, with an established consumer demand for it at those prices, the Commission
rejected the defense, reasoning that for Budweiser to "meet" the prices of local,
"nonpremium" beers was in effect to "beat" the competition. Similar analyses have
prevailed in cases involving yeast,' gasoline,' automatic controls,'9 cigarettes 0
products is sufficient to make them different in grade, but we do not so
hold. It is only when those labels are proven to have demonstrable commer-
cial significance that they can change the grade of a product. Id. at 137-38.
10 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 158 (1955). See also PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 23, 35 (1963). The Court cites Austin as supporting the views of the majority of the At-
torney General's Committee. 339 F.2d at 136, n. 5. However, he seems merely to reiterate
the principle that brand names alone do not alter a commodity's grade or quality: "Where
goods sold under private brands are of the same grade and quality as those sold by the manu-
facturer under his own brands, Section 2(a) applies." AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND
RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 39 (1959).
11 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 158-59 (1955).
12 RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 76 (1962).
13 Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1958).
14 This language has been used in cases involving prices on entire lines of goods, to relieve
the Commission of the obligation to compare prices on each individual item. Moog Indus., Inc.
v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). More generally, Austin
notes that "slight differences in grade and quality will not be of importance if the goods sold
are competitive and if injury to competition may result from price differences ... ." AUSTIN,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 38.
15 . . . nothing contained in sections 12, 13, 14-21, and 22-27 of this title shall prevent a
seller rebutting the prima-facie case . . . by showing that his lower price . . . was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor .... 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
16 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd,
363 U.S. 536 (1960), again rev'd on other grounds, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
17 Standard Brands, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 1485 (1950), aff'd as modified, 189 F.2d 510 (2d
Cir. 1951). Because for nine years Standard's yeast had been priced higher than that of its
competitors, a "competitive situation" had been established such that it was "unnecessary for
[Standard] to meet or match exactly a lower price of a competitor in order to retain business
or to get new business." 46 F.T.C. at 1495.
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and baby food.2 ' The state of the law was recently summarized by the Commission
in Callaway Mills Co.: 22
Both the courts and the Commission have consistently denied the
shelter of the [meeting competition] defense to sellers whose product, be-
cause of intrinsic superior quality or intense public demand, normally
commands a price higher than that usually received by sellers of competi-
tive goods.23
In reviewing this line of cases, the Borden Court was disturbed at an apparent
inconsistency in the Commission's position. If the Borden company had sensed a
threat to its Borden brand sales in a particular area, it could adjust its prices only
within bounds that would maintain the "premium" differential. Yet, in pricing its
own private-label product, a similar differential was held to be price discrimination.
Since the only effective defenses for price differentials which injure competition are
meeting-of-competition and cost justification, and since here there was no claim of
the former, the consequence of the Commission's holding is that Borden must
price its private label only so much lower than the Borden brand as may be ac-
counted for by lower costs of "manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the dif-
fering methods or quantities in which such commodities are . . . sold or de-
livered .... 2' No analysis of the complexities of cost justification is necessary to
demonstrate that the resulting price might not be low enough to compete on the
private-label market.25 The Commission's view therefore means that a company,
by establishing and exploiting a valuable name, could preclude its own entry into
private-label markets. To that extent, competitive success could become self-
limiting.
The Court's reaction is simple and direct:
If [weighing the public demand for a product] is appropriate in consid-
ering the grade and quality of products for purposes of Section 2(b), it is
equally applicable to that determination under Section 2(a). We cannot
approve of the Commission's construing the Act inconsistently from one
case to the next, as appears most advantageous to its position in a particu-
lar case.28
It is submitted that the Court was in error. Arguably, this is a case of first
impression.2 7  Since the FTC precedents did not involve explicit attempts to
18 Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 649 (7th
Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
19 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd on other grounds,
191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
20 Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 237 (2d
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929).
21 Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
22 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) 16800 (FTC, Feb. 10, 1964).
23 Id. at 21755.
24 . . . nothing contained in sections 12, 13, 14-21, and 22-27 of this title shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered .... 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
Cost-justification and meeting-of-competition are the only available defenses to a charge of
price discrimination, absent "changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability
of the goods concerned ...." Ibid.
25 Testimony was adduced indicating a definite ceiling price for private label milk, $1.50
to $2.00 less per case than the Borden brand could command. 339 F.2d at 136, n.3.
26 Id. at 139. (Emphasis added.)
27 In Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958), advertising allow-
ances had been granted on certain pork products to certain purchasers. The Court rejected the
finding that all of the products were of like grade and quality, and one of its grounds, men-
tioned in a footnote, was that the Commission had failed to take account of the prices at which
the products sold. 258 F.2d at 371, n.5. The remark was dictum, and the question of "pre-
minum" labelling was not raised.
Closer to the point was the Fifth Circuit's own opinion in Hartley & Parker, Inc. v.
Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962). Florida Beverage sold nationally-
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demonstrate variations in the marketability of the products found to be of like
grade and quality, they do not directly dispose of the issue here. Nonetheless, it
would seem inappropriate to limit these precedents, as the Court does, to situations
in which brand names have no proven significance. Higher prices are charged for
"Goodyear" and "U.S. Royal" tires and for "Vitamin D Homogenized" milk only
because the prices will be paid. The Commission cannot have been unaware these
many years that brand names markedly affect the public demand for certain prod-
ucts; yet the jurisdictional insignificance of that fact has been readily and con-
sistently presumed.
Likewise, the Court seems to have read too much into the Commission pre-
cedents dealing with the meeting-competition defense under section 2(b). Its key
argument seems to be that the Commission includes the public demand for products
in determinations of "grade" in the 2 (b) cases, while refusing to do so under section
2(a). It is true that the Commission does require maintenance of established
and exploited "premium" price differentials over all competing "nonpremium" goods,
in order to prevent the use of an established trade name to overwhelm local com-
petition on a geographically selective basis. They do not say that "premium" and
"nonpremium" items are of unlike grade, but merely that they are of unequal com-
petitive strength, and that their prices cannot be said to "meet," for purposes of
price regulation, unless allowance is made for that inequality. In 2(b) cases, the
"grade" of the competing products is irrelevant.2 s
The Commission precedents under both sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) are consistent,
moreover, in serving the same basic objective of competition among relatively
equal contestants. The 2(b) cases recognize that public preferences for particular
commodities, imparting to them a "premium" status, are often largely an accidental
function of time, place and public relations. Accordingly, their thrust is to minimize
known liquors both under their own labels and under obscure names, at varying prices. The
Borden Court distinguishes its finding of price discrimination there from the present case on
the ground that Florida's purchasers, retailers and wholesalers, were told the true character of
the private-label liquor, so that the significance of the different trade names was nullified,
while Borden strictly forbade the use of its name in marketing the private-label milk. 339 F.2d
at 137. The distinction may not be sound. The opinion in Hartley & Parker does not indi-
cate whether or not these disclosures were made to the public, and certainly does not rest upon
any explicit assumption that they were. From the facts as reported in the Court's opinion, it
is not clear that the significance of the trade names was nullified effectively by the disclosures.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that in some cases the "promotional" appeal of
certain "commodities" may be determinative of their likeness in grade and quality. The case
itself is distinguishable as involving television programs, for which there is perhaps no other
appropriate standard than "drawing power." Columbia Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration Inc., 295 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1961).
28 The Court was particularly concerned over language in Callaway Mills Co., 3 Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) 16800 (FTC, Feb. 10, 1964) which seems to use the words
"grade" and "saleability" interchangeably:
The quality and saleability of carpeting depend upon many variables
and it offends our common sense to . . . hold, sans affirmative evidence...
that carpeting made by Callaway to sell at a certain price level is similar in
grade and quality to all carpeting made by Callaway's competitors to sell at
approximately the same level. . . . Respondents should have introduced
proof as to the comparative quality and saleability of their goods and the
competitive goods allegedly defended against. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. % 16800,
at 21755.
The Commission clearly indicated, however, that it meant to reiterate the principle developed
by previous meeting-competition cases. See text accompanying note 24 supra. None of these
cases suggest a theoretical equation of "grade" with "saleability." They merely recognize the
fact that "premium" products not only meet but undercut "nonpremium" competition when a
customary price differential is suddenly eliminated. Cases cited notes 17-22 supra. It appears,
therefore, that the Court read too much into what was most probably a careless choice of lan-
guage in the Callaway case.
See also Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956), which affirms that section 2(b) allows a seller to meet the price
of "competing" products, whether of like grade and quality or not.
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the effect of that factor upon competitive opportunities for the many. The opera-
tion of these cases is rather like a system of handicapping under which, because of
its past successes, a race horse is required to carry a heavier burden. Similarly, just
as fighters competing in a certain weight division can only move upwards to meet
the heavier contestants, the 2(a) jurisdictional standards tend to require heavy-
weights like Borden to remain in their own price division. They may branch out
under private labels only at cost-justified prices which do not tend to injure com-
petition. "Premium" competitors, like Borden, presumably have the superior re-
sources for research and refinement of production techniques. Theirs are the in-
calculable advantages, in a wholesaler-retailer market, of names established "in the
trade" as well as in the public eye. Benefiting from "premium" earnings which are
not entirely accounted for by higher costs of "premium!' marketing, their products
and their prices could be expected to define the private-label competition, establish-
ing or tending to establish the price levels at which the contest will be waged.
Ultimately, the issue seems to resolve itself into a choice between alternative
views of the "competition" which the act is designed to protect. The meaning of
"like grade" has not been legislatively clarified, and is no more logically to be
divined by reference to "promotional" features than by examination only of physical
properties. Its meaning, in short, cannot be discovered, but must be constructed
to suit the broad objectives of the act.
The Court saw in its conclusion an adherence to the Supreme Court's counsel
that the act be applied consistently with "broader antitrust policies that have been
laid down by Congress," to avoid a "price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict
with the purposes of other antitrust legislation." 2 It is thus arguable that Borden
should be free to price its milk at the levels sustained by any market Borden is
willing and able to exploit. This argument assumes that it is Borden's competitive
flexibility with which the act is primarily concerned. Currently, however, there are
two distinct spheres of competition: one occupied by Borden, and other "national"
brands, and the other by smaller, less prestigious companies who produce comparable
goods for lower stakes.2 0 The Commission's finding that these commodities are of
like grade, sufficiently comparable for price regulation purposes, reflects the view
that this competitive situation - in which many can compete because there are
both "premium" and "nonpremium" markets - is the proper object of its concern.
To write either view into the law is certainly to perform a legislative function
of great consequences. Given the necessity of a choice, however, the Commission's
view seems preferable. Its inquiries are thereby directed to the issue which is critical
in all price discrimination cases: to what extent do price differentials adversely affect
the competition among those who deal with the commodities? Aside from questions
of cost justification, Borden's private-label operations are not prejudiced by the
jurisdictional holding if they do not tend "substantially to lessen competition." An
essential element3 1 of the Commission's burden was to show that Borden's expansion
attracted enough business from other packers appreciably to tend to narrow the
field, and that certain private-label customers were favored over others. The Com-
mission faced these questions, addressing itself to the jurisdictional standard as a
device by which Congress meant to preserve and expand competitive opportunity
for the many. The Court, although it saw "considerable merit" in Borden's
29 Automatic Canteen Co., v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74, 63 (1953).
30 See note 25 supra.
31 ... the Commission has always construed the Act to require it as a part of its
affirmative case to present evidence that a discrimination may lessen or tend
to injure competition. General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 890 (1954).
Where that burden has not been sustained, the cases have been dismissed. See, e.g., Champion
Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953). The Commission and the courts generally have not
followed the view suggested by the Second Circuit, that where a discrimination alone was
shown, the burden would be on anyone making such discrimination to show that no injury
to competition would occur. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945); FTC v.
Standard Brands, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
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arguments as well as in its cost justification, 2 foreclosed them, and placed a potential
threat to that policy beyond inquiry.
Kevin W. Carey
DIvORCE - ALIMONY - SURVIVAL OF PAYMENTS FOLLOWING DEATH OF
HUSBAND. - A divorce decree entered in May, 1951, confirming a property settle-
ment, provided that "the plaintiff . . . is awarded alimony to be paid by the de-
fendant in the sum of one hundred fifty dollars per month so long as she shall live,
or until her re-marriage." The husband paid the designated amount monthly until
his death in July, 1961, but his executor rejected the ex-wife's claim for $150 per
month afterwards. The trial court directed continuation of the alimony payments
from the estate. On appeal the Supreme Court of Washington, reversing this judg-
ment, held: the payments abate on the death of the husband. "So long as she shall
live" is not an expression of sufficient clarity to enable a finding of judicial intent
that the payments survive death of the husband. Bird v. Henke, 395 P.2d 751
(Wash. 1964).
A divorce decree entered in April, 1943, awarded the plaintiff "a property
division and an award of alimony and support money for her care, support and
maintenance" and provided for $200 per month "for the care, support and main-
tenance of the plaintiff and her minor children," to be reduced when the children
became of age or self-supporting "to One Hundred Doll,=s a month to continue
during the lifetime of the plaintiff and while she remains unmarried." The husband
paid the designated sum monthly until his death in March, 1962, but, his executor
rejected the ex-wife's claim for $100 per month afterwards. The trial court directed
payment for as long as claimant lived. On appeal the Supreme Court of Iowa,
affirming this judgment, held: the husband's estate is bound to make the payments.
The expression in the court's decree as to when the payments were to terminate
was sufficiently clear to indicate this finding. In Re Roberts' Estate, 131 N.W.2d
458 (Iowa 1964).
These two decisions illustrate a recurring problem in the interpretation of a
divorce decree which has granted alimony or support payments to the ex-wife for
a period defined by language to the effect of "until she dies or remarries." The
problem arises from the common law rule that the obligation to pay alimony,
derived from the obligation to support, is a personal one and terminates upon the
death of the husband or wife.' It has been held that the power of a court does
not extend to the granting of decrees binding the husband's estate to make alimony
payments after his death.2 That argument can be mooted, however, by either of
two developments: (1) statutes which give the court such power, or (2) settlement
agreements adopted or incorporated into a divorce decree, which contain the con-
sent of the husband to be so bound.3
Given this power in the court, the derivative issue is: did the court exercise, or
intend to exercise, the power? 4 This question is complicated by the notion, sur-
viving from the common law rule, that the payments are presumed to terminate
upon the husband's death and that a clear intention to the contrary is necessary
to overcome the presumption.2
32 339 F.2d at 139.
1 E.g., In re Yoss' Estate, 237 Iowa 1092, 24 N.W.2d 399, 400 (1946); Wilson v. Hin-
man, 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236, 237 (1905). See 17 Am. JUR. Divorce and Separation §§ 694,
699 (1957); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 240b (1959).
2 Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1964); See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R. 2d
1406 (1955).
3 See, e.g., Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P.2d 247, 248 (1935); In re Traver's
Estate, 2 Wis. 2d 509, 87 N.W. 2d 269, 274 (1958).
4 Where the decree incorporates a settlement agreement, the issue, more technically, is:
did the husband give, or intend to give, his consent; if so, then the textual issue is reached.
5 Bird v. Henke, 395 P.2d 751, 752, 753 (Wash. 1964).
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That what is unmistakable language to one court can be unclear to another is
well illustrated by the principal cases. A review of the recent cases" dealing with
this problem of interpretation suggests that a completely satisfactory resolution of
the problem is unlikely. The practicing lawyer can be alerted to the need for
ultra-specific language in settlements and decrees arising in the future, but the
problem remains with decrees previously made. Unless the parties to a decree,
having agreed on the proper construction, petition the court to amend it to clearly
reflect such construction, the difficulty remains. No analysis of the interpretation
of decretal language can clear up the many ambiguous decrees which will be fodder
for future suits if the husband predeceases the wife.
The courts will look to a variety of factors to determine the import of decretal
language. The least satisfactory method is to simply read the words and supply
intent out of the air, saying, for example, that since the decree has in mind the
life of the wife, the judge also must have had in mind the life of the husband, and,
since no mention of his life was made, the life of the husband was not to control.7
The countervailing argument to this is that the husband's life was not mentioned
because the judge knew that under the law the husband's death would automatically
terminate the payments unless he provided otherwise.8 Justifications more satis-
factory than these must be sought.
One such justification can be found where the decree expressly relates pay-
ments to the husband's income. Where the decree was "pay to the plaintiff from
his income the sum of $15 per week during her life, as alimony for the plaintiff and
support for the child," it was stated that
the express terms of the award clearly manifest an intention that it
should cease upon the death of the divorced husband, because that even
would terminate the receipt of any income by him.... The provision...
that the periodic payments of alimony should be made during the plaintiff's
life must, if possible, be construed in harmony with the language as to the
making of such payments from income.9
This reasonable conclusion can be extended to decrees that do not contain the
magic words "from income" by reason of the rule that any alimony payments may
be modified upon a showing of a change in circumstances, i.e., reduction in the
husband's income. The argument is, of course, that if a reduction in income may
be grounds for reduction of alimony, then a complete elimination of income should
be grounds for the complete elimination of the alimony.10 This conclusion seems to
beg the question.
Where the decree purports to bind heirs, executors, administrators and assigns,
it might be expected that this offers clear justification to continue the payments
after the husband's death, but the decisions do not regard presence of such a
phrase as controlling, but rather as "some indication""- or binding "so far as appro-
priate." 12 Absence of such a clause will not necessitate abatement of the pay-
ments.23 But, where it was agreed that the wife would not file any claim in the
husband's estate unless the "[husband] failed and neglected to carry out the cov-
enants, provisions, and conditions of this agreement on his part to be performed,"
and the executrix claimed that this meant "husband in his lifetime failed," whereas
the ex-wife argued it meant "husband or his estate failed," the Court said that
since the agreement elsewhere bound the administrators, this was enough to make
6 Cases prior to 1960 are covered in the periodicals reviewing Stoutland v. Stoutland, 103
N.W.2d 286 (N.D. 1960); the case note at 10 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 194 (1960) gave an excellent
pre-1960 treatment of this same problem.-
7 Brief for Respondent, p. 6, Bird v. Henke, 395 P.2d 751 (Wash. 1964).
8 In re Roberts' Estate, 131 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Iowa 1964) (dissent).
9 Harrison v. Union and New Haven Trust Co., 147 Conn. 435, 162 A.2d 182, 184(1960) ; accord, In re Breaznell's Estate, 35 Misc.2d 256, 228 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Surr. Ct. 1962).
10 See Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wash.2d 454, 348 P.2d 225, 227 (1960).
11 In re Breaznell's Estate, 35 Misc.2d 256, 228 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923 (Surr. Ct. 1962).
12 In re Kettering's Estate, 151 Colo. 202, 376 P.2d 983, 987 (1962).
13 In re Fredenthal's Estate, 25 Misc.2d 1068, 206 N.Y.S.2d 194, 198 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
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unclear the construction of the release clause, and thus that clause could not limit
the express provision that the payments would continue "so long as she lives and
is unmarried."' 4 These cases illustrate that a mere statement that one's heirs and
executors will be bound by the decree or agreement is not of sufficient clarity to
insure uniform interpretation.
Interpretation that the payments will survive is indicated when the decree
makes express provision for securing the payments after the husband's death through
an insurance policy, as where the husband, "to secure the payment to the wife of
said $325 monthly payments in the event the husband predeceased the wife, had
agreed to name the wife the irrevocable beneficiary... " and the policies provided
that at the death of the insured, the wife is to be paid the sum of $325 monthly.' 5
But where one clause of an agreement provided for payments of $250 per month
"so long as the wife shall live or until she remarries," and another clause provided
only that the husband would maintain and keep in force a $10,000 insurance policy
of which the wife would be beneficiary, the Court concluded that the latter provision
strongly implied that the policy was to replace the monthly payments to the
plaintiff when the husband's earning power came to an end by death.' 6
Indication of other supplementary or substitutional arrangements thus can
make interpretation relatively simple. But outside circumstances, to insure justice,
can require that interpretation violating express language be made. Where the
payments of $250 per month were to continue until the death of either party, but
if the wife remarried were to be cut to $125 per month for the care of a minor
child, and the husband died, it seems clear that the provisions require that the
payments cease. However, the husband left a will in which he made no provision
for the minor child, "for the reason that I deem that adequate provision has already
been made for her in the property settlement agreement." The Court struggled to
conclude that the estate must pay $125 per month to the wife for the support of
the child, using the interpretation that the parties gave to the agreement as the
best indication of what the intention was at the time the contract was made.2
7
These recent decisions point up the problems inherent in determining the ef-
fect of the husband's death on continuation of alimony awards. The lesson to be
learned is clear: the lawyer drafting a separation agreement should specify what
is to be the effect of the husband's death; this specification must not be by way
of implication, since the courts do not give literal effect to "until the wife's death,"
but rather must be in express language. If the payments are to continue, the
lawyer is well advised to use language such as "in the event of the death of the
husband before the wife, the husband charges his estate and his heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns with the payment to her of. . . " after the provision
for payment "until the wife dies or remarries." If the payments are to abate, then
they should be stated "to end upon the death of either husband or wife or the
remarriage of the wife."
The likely contingency of the husband's predecease must be mentioned in order
that there be no argument about the effect of its omission. The problems and costs
in money and human feelings involved in divorce and separation contests are too
plentiful not to have as nearly complete a settlement as possible in the one action,
rather than a renascence of bitterness up to fifty years later' s when the husband
predeceases the wife.
14 Hawkins v. McLaughlin, 196 Cal.App.2d 318, 16 Cal.Rptr. 572, 576 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961).
15 In re Ostwald's Estate, 20 Misc.2d 1001, 189 N.Y.S.2d 472, 481 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
16 Desiardins v. Desjardins, 193 F.Supp. 210 (E.D. Ky. 1961), modified on other grounds,
308 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1962).
17 Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 131 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), petition dismissed,
139 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1962).
18 In Harrison v. Union and New Haven Trust Co., 147 Conn. 435, 162 A.2d 182 (1960),
discussed in text accompanying note 9 supra, the divorce decree was granted in 1916.
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Of course, the admonition to draft with specificity is easily made and, doubt-
lessly, easily ignored. Perhaps, then, it is appropriate for the courts to reconsider
the presumption to be given ambiguous language in these cases. Currently, the
presumption is against an intent to continue payments after the husband's death.
If this is based upon probability, there is no evidence available to substantiate the
assertion that the average husband so intends. The sounder basis for creating a
presumption has to be public policy, rather than assumed probability. The factors
involved include: (1) the social desirability of providing the wife with an income
for life; and (2) the undesirable burden placed upon an estate when the Executor
is required to continue such payments to the detriment of the testator's plan of
disposition O When one considers that the average small estate would be consumed
in an attempt to fulfill an obligation to continue payments, a proper regard for
the expectations and needs of the deceased husband's natural objects of affection
requires continuance of the existing presumption. Michael C. Farrar
LEGAL ETHICS - SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS - CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF UNION MEMBERS TO ADVISE INJURED WORKERS TO OBTAIN LEGAL ADVICE AND
TO RECOMMEND SPECIFIC LAWYERS DOES NOT LICENSE THE SOLICITING OF LEGAL
EMPLOYMENT. - The Virginia State Bar- brought a suit to enjoin the Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen from carrying on activities which were alleged to constitute
the solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized practice of law in Virginia.
The Brotherhood admitted that in order to assist the prosecution of claims by injured
railroad workers or by the families of workers killed on the job it maintains in Vir-
ginia, as well as throughout the country, a Department of Legal Counsel. The De-
partment's function is to recommend to injured Brotherhood members or their fam-
ilies the names of lawyers believed to be honest and competent. Upon finding that
the Brotherhood's plan resulted in the channeling of substantially all the workers'
claims to lawyers recommended by the Department of Legal Counsel, the Chancery
Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, enjoined the Brotherhood from carrying
out its plan in Virginia. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia af-
firmed summarily over objections that the injunction abridged the Brotherhood's
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments, which guarantee freedom of
speech, petition and assembly. Granting certiorari "to consider this constitutional
question in the light of our recent decision in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
[1963]."l The United States Supreme Court held: "that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect the right of the members through their Brotherhood to main-
tain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured to obtain legal
advice and for recommending specific lawyers." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The Supreme Court then
vacated the judgment and decree and remanded the case for proceedings not in-
consistent with its opinion.
On remand, the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, issued
a new injunction limiting "the constitutional rights of the defendant, its officers,
agents, servants, employees or members, to advise the defendant's members or their
families or others, to obtain legal advice before making settlement of their claims
for injury or death, and to recommend a specific lawyer or lawyers to give such
advice or handle such claims" to instances where "the circumstances of such advice
19 See In re Bernstein's Estate, 25 Misc.2d 717, 203 N.Y.S.2d 191, 195 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
1 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 2(1964).
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and recommendation shall not constitute or amount to, the solicitation of legal em-
ployment for or on behalf of any lawyer or lawyers." Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Final Order p. 4, Ch. Ct. Richmond, Va.,
January 15, 1965.
The basic issue in this case is the extent to which an organization may translate
into action its legitimate interest in seeing that its members are able to procure
competent legal counsel without running afoul of the prohibitions against the un-
authorized practice of law and the solicitation of legal business.
The impact of the Supreme Court decision on this area of the law is viewed
by some commentators as being extremely significant. 2 Others consider it of little
importance in making the practical determination of what constitutes solicitation
in a given instance.3 The Supreme Court decision itself is vague enough to be open
to either interpretation.4 Such vagueness, however, does not characterize the
Chancery Court's opinion and decree. It gives the Supreme Court decision its nar-
rowest possible interpretation, forcing a determination of whether the Chancery
Court's decree has correctly supplied the guidelines within which the Supreme Court
implied that the Brotherhood was to operate its plan5 or, as the Brotherhood con-
tends, has evaded the Supreme Court's mandate.6
The Brotherhood's plan was originated in 1930 to protect injured members, or
the families of fatally injured members, from being pressured into inadequate set-
tlements by unscrupulous railroad claims agents, or from being victimized by incom-
petent or unethical attorneys, many of whom solicited the cases and demanded a
50%b contingent fee.7 The Brotherhood divided the United States into sixteen re-
gions and chose one regional counsel in each who was recommended to Brotherhood
members injured within the region. The Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood
2 Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 306 (1965);
Markus, Group Representation by Attorneys as Misconduct, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rav. 1 (1965);
Comment, 16 S.C.L. REv. 528 (1964); 16 SYRAcusE L. REv. 141 (1964); 43 Tax. L. Rlv.
254 (1964); 26 U. PITT. L. REv. 142 (1964).
3 Simpson, Group Legal Services: The Case for Caution, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 327, 335
(1965). It is argued that the original decree of the Chancery Court did not prohibit the
Brotherhood from recommending specific lawyers, but only from soliciting for the recommended
lawyers. By merely affirming this uncontested right to recommend specific lawyers, the Su-
preme Court decision does not disturb the existing doctrine of solicitation. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Opinion pp. 12-13, Ch. Ct. Richmond,
Va., Jan. 15, 1965; Petition for Rehearing for Respondent, pp. 3-5, 8-10, Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). It is interesting to
note, however, that the American Bar Association originally disagreed with the Virginia State
Bar on this point, equating recommendation with solicitation. It contended that the original
decree of the Chancery Court, by enjoining solicitation, did bar the Brotherhood from recom-
mending specific attorneys. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 11,
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, supra.
4 At various stages of this litigation the American Bar Association has adopted both
interpretations. Immediately after the Supreme Court decided the case, the American Bar
Association urged a rehearing on the grounds that the opinion, by appearing "to state that
the Brotherhood can solicit cases for specific Attorneys," "damages the Canons of Professional
Ethics, and the Rules of Law prohibiting the Unauthorized Practice of Law, so severely as
to make future enforcement of the Canons and Rules of Law almost impossible." Brief for
the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae for Rehearing, pp. 4-5, Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, supra note 3. However, when the Chancery
Court issued its decree narrowly interpreting the Supreme Court decision, the American Bar
Association announced that "the revised order upholds the position taken by the ABA in
advising lawyers that the Supreme Court's Brotherhood decision was not a 'license to solicit.'"
News from the American Bar Association, Jan. 26, 1965, p. 2.
5 This is the contention of the American Bar Association. News from the American Bar
Association, supra note 4.
6 The Brotherhood directed this objection to the proposed decree offered by the Virginia
State Bar, which was adopted by the Chancery Court with very little change. Memorandum
of Argument of the Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen on the Decree Offered by the Bar, p. 6,
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Ch. Ct. Richmond, Va.,
Jan. 15, 1965.
7 In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163, 165 (1958).
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employed several full-time investigators for each region whose duties were to in-
vestigate all accidents involving members' within the region, make these accident
reports available to the injured member's attorney and, most importantly, urge the
injured member or his family to employ the regional counsel. Investigators often
carried photographs of large settlement checks to impress the injured member
with the regional counsel's past success and also carried contracts of retainer. The
regional counsel gave free legal advice and, if retained, handled these suits for a
contingent fee set by the Brotherhood at considerably less than the prevailing rate.
In addition, the expenses of the litigation were borne by the regional counsel and
the costs of operating the Brotherhood's Legal Aid Department, including the salaries
of the investigators, were divided among the regional counsel.8
From its inception, the plan was under heavy attack by the courts, almost
without exception.9 Consequently, it has been modified to eliminate its most objec-
tionable features. At the present time, the Brotherhood contends10 that its plan is
operated in accordance with the guidelines established by the Illinois Supreme Court
in 1958.1 This latest plan differs from the older ones in several important re-
spects. The Brotherhood still designates a single attorney or firm as the regional
counsel and the investigators still recommend that injured members or their families
employ him, but there is no financial tie between the Brotherhood and the regional
counsel. Investigators no longer carry photographs of settlement checks or contracts
of retainer. The regional counsel sets his own fees after consultation with the client
and makes no payments, either direct or indirect, to the Brotherhood. The costs of
operating the Department of Legal Counsel (as it has since been renamed), includ-
ing the salaries of the investigators, are borne by the Brotherhood. As has always
been the case, the injured member or his family is free to choose an attorney other
than the recommended regional counsel and, if the regional counsel is chosen, the
injured member or his family, not the Brotherhood, controls the course of the liti-
gation.1
2
For the purposes of deciding the case, the Supreme Court assumed that the
Brotherhood's plan was operating in accordance with these guidelines established
by the Illinois Supreme Court.1 3 The Supreme Court primarily considered only those
parts of the original decree to which the Brotherhood objected14 - those which en-
joined it
from holding out lawyers selected by it as the only approved lawyers to
aid the members or their families; ... or in any other manner soliciting
or encouraging such legal employment of the selected lawyers; . . . and
from doing any act or combination of acts, and from formulating and
8 These facts are set out in Hulse v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404(Mo. 1960), and In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
9 See Hulse v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960); State v.
Lush, 170 Neb. 376, 103 N.W.2d 136 (1960); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn.App. 63, 260
S.W.2d 379 (1952); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); Re
O'Neill, 5 F.Supp. 465 (D.C.N.Y. 1933); Re Committee on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar
Ass'n, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (App. 1933). But see Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v.
Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 226 F.Supp. 345 (1964); Atchison, T & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d
390 (10th Cir. 1956); Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Il.App. 364 (1932). Hildebrand v.
State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508, 514, 518 (1950) (Carter, J., dissenting) (Traynor,3., dissenting).
10 Memorandum of Argument of the Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen on the Decree Of-
fered by the Bar, supra note 6, at 17; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 17-19, Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
11 In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
12 These facts are contained in the Brief for Petitioner, pp. 17-19, supra note 10.
13 See 377 U.S. at 5 n. 9.
14 Ibid. The other parts of the decree were passed on by the Court only to the extent
necessary to prevent their being construed at a later date to bar the Brotherhood from advising
injured members not to settle without a lawyer and from recommending lawyers selected by
the Brotherhood. Ibd.
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putting into practice any plan, pattern or design, the result of which is to
channel legal employment to any particular lawyer or group of lawyers.
15
In holding that the first and fourteenth amendments protect the associational
rights of the members of the union "personally or through a special department of
their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistance - and, most
importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on,"16 the Court ex-
tended the principle of NAACP v. Button 7 even though personal injury litigation,
rather than litigation as a form of political expression, was involved. While affirming
the broad powers of a state to regulate the practice of law within its borders, the
Court reiterated that "a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights
by mere labels." ' It noted that Virginia was seeking to halt neither conduct which
constituted "a commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten the
moral and ethical fabric of the administration of justice," nor "ambulance chasing,"
nor the unauthorized "practice of law," nor "any soliciting of business."1 9 The
Supreme Court then said that "since the part of the decree to which the Brotherhood
objects infringes those rights, it cannot stand; and to the extent any other part of
the decree forbids these activities it too must fall."' 20
Upon receiving the case on remand, the Chancery Court issued a decree en-joining the Brotherhood, its officers, agents, servants, employees, members and anyone
acting on its behalf
.. . from soliciting for, or on behalf of, its Regional or Legal Counsel
or any other lawyer, any of its members, their families or any other person
to employ such Regional or Legal Counsel or other lawyer to represent him,
her or them in court or otherwise, in respect to any claim for personal in-jury, death or in relation to property; from informing any lawyer or lawyers
or any person whomsoever that an accident has been suffered by a mem-
ber or non-member of the said Brotherhood and furnishing the name and
address of such injured or deceased person for the purpose of obtaining
legal employment for any lawyer; from stating or suggesting that a recom-
mended lawyer will defray expenses of any kind or make advances for any
purpose to such injured persons or their families pending settlement of their
claims; . . . from doing any act or combination of acts that constitutes or
amounts to the solicitation of legal employment for or on behalf of any
lawyer, or conspiring to do so....
But nothing herein contained shall be construed to infringe upon or
restrict the constitutional rights of the defendant, its officers, agents,
servants, employees or members, to advise the defendant's members or their
families or others, to obtain legal advice before making settlement of their
claims for injury or death, and to recommend a specific lawyer or lawyers
to give such advice or handle such claims; provided, however, that the cir-
cumstances of such advice and recommendation shall not constitute or
amount to, the solicitation of legal employment for or on behalf of any
lawyer or lawyers. The term "solicit" and its derivatives, as herein em-
ployed, shall refer to the same terms as employed or intended by the
common law, the statutes of this state, and Canons of Legal Ethics of the
American Bar Association, adopted in this state.21
The Chancery Court justified this decree by referring to a section of the Supreme
Court opinion in which it thought it perceived a distinction drawn between advice
and recommendation on the one hand, and channeling of legal employment, on the
other.2 2 At best, this distinction is largely illusory. If the protected activity - the
15 Id. at 4-5.
16 Id. at 6.
17 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
18 377 U.S. at 6.
19 Id. at 6-7.
20 Id. at 8.
21 Virginia ex reL Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Final Order pp.
3-4, Ch. Ct. Richmond, Va., Jan. 15, 1965.
22 Mr. Justice Black distinguishes (p. 1116) [377 U.S. at 5] between the
advice, on the one hand, to injured members to obtain legal services and to
recommend particular attorneys and, on the other hand, the resulting chan-
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advice and recommendation - has the natural and probable result of channeling
the Brotherhood's personal injury litigation to the recommended attorneys, and this
channeling is solely the result of such advice and recommendation, not of any other
unprotected activity such as fee-splitting, is not this "channeling" also protected?
Yet, the Chancery Court took the position that if the protected activity resulted in
channeling, it constituted solicitation per se.
In considering these two cases as a unit, there is a manifest difficulty in as-
certaining with precision the applicable law. The Supreme Court holds that the
Brotherhood can advise injured members to obtain legal advice and recommend
specific lawyers, emphasizing that this activity does not constitute solicitation or
ambulance chasing.23 In previous cases, the contrary result has been reached.24 The
Supreme Court does not indicate where advice and recommendation ends and so-
licitation begins.
The Chancery Court agreed that such advice and recommendation does not
constitute solicitation. 25 However, the decree is so narrowly drawn that any advice
and recommendation which results in the channeling of legal business to the recom-
mended attorney would constitute solicitation 26 - a result clearly incongruous with
the Supreme Court decision. Like the Supreme Court, the Chancery Court offered
no explicit definition of solicitation. Instead, it subscribed to that definition "em-
ployed or intended by the common law, the statutes of this state, and Canons of
Legal Ethics of the American Bar Association, adopted in this state."
27
An attempt at ascertaining the definition of solicitation employed by the com-
mon law2s is fruitless as the courts have been extremely reluctant to offer a com-
prehensive definition of solicitation, preferring the dichotomy of permissible solicita-
nelling of legal employment. He then states that the injunction against
"this particular practice" denies the members their constitutional rights.
Obviously, "practice" does not refer to the result, because a result is not a
practice and a practice is a repeated act or a series of acts. If Mr. Justice
Black had wished to state that the injunction against the channelling of
legal employment deprived the members of constitutional rights, he could
have substituted "plan" for "practice." As he did not, his intention is plain
- he referred to and approved only advice and recommendation.
Virginia ex re. Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Opinion pp. 10-11, Oh.
Ct. Richmond, Va., Jan. 15, 1965.
23 377 U.S. at 6-7.
24 See Hulse v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960); Doughty v.
Grills, 37 Tenn.App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952); Association of the Bar of the City of New
York Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions No. 799 (1955) & 377 (formerly 509)
(1936); New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion
No. 147 (1918). But see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); In re Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 13 Il.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958); In re Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N.E.2d
749 (1936).
25 Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Opinion p. 12,
Ch. Ct. Richmond, Va., Jan. 15, 1965.
26 Virginia cx rel. Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra note 25,
at 10-11.
27 Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Final Order p.
4, Ch. Ct. Richmond, Va., Jan. 15, 1965.
28 At common law, mere solicitation, as opposed to the stirring up of litigation, was not
condemned. Chreste v. Louisville Ry., 167 Ky. 75, 180 S.W. 49, 53 (1915). The prohibitions
against the stirring up of litigation were phrased in terms of barratry, champetry and main-
tenance. Barratry is the criminal offense of exciting and stirring up suits with the malicious
motive of oppressing or harassing another, no matter how well-founded the suit may be. State
v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bailey) 379 (1830). Champetry is an agreement by a stranger with
a party to a suit to bear the expenses of the suit in return for a share in what may be recov-
ered; the gravamen of the offense is the "officious intermeddling in the affairs of others for
purposes of speculation or other unworthy motives.. . ." Curry v. Dahlberg, 341 Mo. 897,
110 S.W.2d 742, 748 (1937). Maintenance exists "where a man, improperly and for the pur-
pose of stirring up litigation and strife, encourages others, either to bring actions of [sic] to
make defenses, which they have no right to make." Schaferman v. O'Brien, 28 Md. 565, 574
(1868).
It is clear that the exercise by the Brotherhood of its right to advise and recommend
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tion and improper solicitation. 29 In all cases, the literal meaning of the word "solicit,"
in the sense of asking, urging or enticing, is present in the defendants' conduct in
seeking legal employment.
Solicitation has been deemed permissible on the grounds that the personal
relations between the solicitor and the one solicited justify the former's conduct,30
or the solicitor is not soliciting in consideration of any remuneration,8' or the so-
licitor's motive is not to stir up litigation for the sake of the fees which he will earn,
but to see that justice is secured for the one solicited . 2 Solicitation which does not
contain these extenuating factors is deemed improper. Yet, some courts hold that
solicitation is improper although the solicitor receives no monetary remuneration for
his solicitation S3 Other courts require an overt act, designed to effectuate the solicited
legal employment, to be carried out before improper solicitation is constituted.
3 4
The nature of the overt act required would, of course, vary according to the court.
The statutes of Virginia contain a precise, albeit stringent, definition of "so-
licitation of professional employment":
[MThe obtaining or attempting to obtain for an attorney at law repre-
sentation of some other person to render legal services for such other person
and whereby such attorney at law will or may receive compensation; pro-
vided that neither conduct limited to mere statements of opinion respecting
the ability of a lawyer, nor conduct pursuant to a uniform legal aid or
lawyer referral plan approved by the Virginia State Bar, shall be deemed
the solicitation of professional employment.35
The Canons of Professional Ethics do not define solicitation. The distinction
between permissible and improper solicitation embodied in case law is present, but
the category of "permissible solicitation" is much narrower, as Canon 27 states that
"it is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements,
through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by per-
sonal relations." (Emphasis added.) Canon 28 issues an even more absolute pro-
hibition:
[I]t is disreputable . . . to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like pur-
poses, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or
influence the bringing of such cases to his office....
The Virginia Court's decree effectively evades the mandate of the Supreme
Court. Case law has indicated that advice and recommendation, even in the absence
of any monetary compensation, can be held to constitute solicitation.3 6 Even where
the performance of an overt act designed to effectuate the legal employment solic-
ited is required, a court so disposed might have little difficulty in finding that the
formal organization through which the Brotherhood exercises its right to advise and
recommend satisfies this requirement.
It is also questionable whether the exercise of the Brotherhood's right to advise
through the plan suggested by the Illinois Supreme Court does not fall within the scope of
these prohibitions. Thus, when the Chancery Court spoke of the "common law" definition of
"solicitation" it probably had in mind fairly recent cases which attempt to set limits upon
activities which, though objectionable, could not be categorized as barratry, champetry or
maintenance. For a discussion of these cases see text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
29 In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 52 N.E.2d 807, 816 (1944).
30 A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics No. 27; Association of the Bar of the City of New
York Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions No. 231 (formerly 300) (1932) & 487(formerly 642) (1939); New York County Lawyers' Committee on Professional Ethics,
Opinion No. 126 (1917).
31 See In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 52 N.E.2d 807, 817 (1944); In re Dunn, 370 Ill. 413,
19 N.E.2d 186 (1938).
32 People v. Edelson, 313 Ill. 448, 145 N.E. 246, 249 (1924).
33 Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508, 512 (1950). See Doughty v.
Grills, 37 Tenn.App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379, 390 (1952).
34 E.g., People v. Levy, 8 Cal.App.2d 763, 50 P.2d 509 (Super. Ct. 1935)..
35 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-78(c) (Supp. 1964).
36 Cases cited note 33 supra.
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and recommend would avoid the Virginia statute's prohibition against attempting
to obtain legal employment for an attorney.
Canons 27 and 28 of the Canons of Professional Ethics have been interpreted
to permit the recommendation of a particular attorney where such recommendations
are neither compensated for nor made with any great frequency.37 However, where
chronic recommendations to see a particular attorney were made by officials of a
labor union as an incident of a formal plan similar to that of the Brotherhood's,
the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York held that this was a clear violation of Canons 27 and 28.38 There is
little reason to doubt that the Brotherhood's plan would not be similarly labelled.
It is arguable that the Supreme Court tacitly adopted the guidelines established
by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1958.39 This would appear to be the proper infer-
ence since the Supreme Court rendered its decision upon the assumption that the
Brotherhood's plan was functioning in accordance with the standards adopted by
the Illinois Supreme Court.40 Thus, the more correct interpretation of the Supreme
Court decision would permit the Brotherhood to exercise its right to advise and
recommend within the framework of that plan.
The principal difficulty in the Supreme Court decision is that it allows "solicita-
tion" activity previously prohibited41 without offering a new definition of solicitation.
It simply said that this activity does not constitute solicitation without revealing the
standard against which the Court measured the activity in making this determination.
However, it would have been better to admit that this activity did indeed constitute
solicitation, but was a form of solicitation which would be permitted under certain
detailed circumstances.
Much of the uncertainty stems from the inappropriateness of the arguments
against solicitation when they are applied to the activities of an organization.42
The standard arguments are that solicitation results in stirring up litigation, fraudulent
claims, corruption of public officials, detriment to the legal profession and harm to
the client.43 The Brotherhood's plan is not aimed at lining the pockets of the particular
attorney recommended, but rather at protecting the rights of the individual mem-
ber in an area of vital concern to the entire organization.44 Under such circum-
stances solicitation does not result in detriment to the legal profession because the
popular image of the lawyer as "a disinterested champion of justice" is not tainted
by the "aggressive pursuit of financial gain."45 Furthermore, rather than resulting in
harm to the client, such solicitation is actually beneficial to him. 46 The lawyer
selected and recommended by the Brotherhood is apt to be more competent in han-
dling personal injury suits than an attorney selected at random by one totally unac-
customed to dealing with attorneys.47 The client will also probably have the bene-
37 In re Seidman, 228 App.Div. 515, 240 N.Y.S. 592 (1930); Association of the Bar of
the City of New York Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 176 (formerly 209)(1931).
38 Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional Ethics,
Opinion No. 799 (1955).
39 In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
40 See 377 U.S. at 5 n. 9. Allegations that the Court approved the old Brotherhood plan,
or that the Court approved only the Brotherhood's right to advise and recommend without
approving its natural and probable result - the channeling of substantially all the workers'
personal injury claims to the recommended attorneys - appear equally untenable.
41 Authorities cite note 24 supra.
42 Cf., Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1629 (1963).
43 Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. Rav. 674, 675 (1958).
44 Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508, 518-22 (1950) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
45 While agreeing that this objection to solicitation is groundless, the existence of this
popular image of the lawyer is challenged by Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. Rav. 674, 681 (1958).
46 Id. at 684.
47 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex tel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1,
4 (1964).
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fit of a somewhat lower contingent fee, even though the actual setting of the fee
scale by the organization is not allowed by the courts,48 since the recommended at-
torney is assured of a comfortable income because of the volume of cases referred
to him and will make such an unbargained-for concession in order to retain his
advantageous position as the recommended attorney.49 For this same reason, there
is little likelihood that the recommended attorney would settle the claims for in-
adequate amounts.
The potency of the arguments that solicitation corrupts public officials
and encourages fraudulent claims is also greatly impaired when examined in the
context of solicitation by a nonprofit organization. The attorneys recommended
by an organization like the Brotherhood are chosen on the advice of local lawyers
and federal and state judges, upon the basis of their reputation for honesty and
professional skill.50 The solicitation on behalf of the recommended attorney is
not done by individuals working on a fiat fee or commission basis who would
be in a position to manufacture evidence and benefit financially from the bring-
ing of fraudulent claims. In private solicitation schemes, the soliciting individuals
are often doctors, hospital personnel, policemen and others engaged in public
service.51 Since the solicitation by organizations like the Brotherhood is carried on
by special investigators or simply by organization members, this solicitation is not
open to the charge of corrupting public officials.
The objection that solicitation results in the stirring up of litigation is appli-
cable to solicitation by organizations. However, the validity of this objection as a
grounds for proscribing some forms of solicitation is being increasingly questioned
in terms of desirable public policy. 52 The prohibitions against stirring up litigation
arose centuries ago when the courts were easily corrupted.53 At present, the courts
play such an important role in righting injustices that access to the courts has been
held to be a constitutionally protected form of political expression even though
the claims involved have been solicited.5 4 Thus, rather than being an evil to be
avoided if at all possible, litigation is often viewed as a definite good.55 For
example, the courts have allowed the solicitation of actions to enforce certain
laws.58
It is in the public interest to allow solicitation by an organization of the
personal injury claims of its members to prevent them from being forced into
inadequate settlements by unscrupulous claims agents or from being victimized
by incompetent or overreaching attorneys. If solicitation by an organization pre.
vents tortfeasors from escaping their just liabilities, while permitting the injured
to avoid becoming public charges, public policy should be in favor of this solici-
tation absent undesirable results.
Among the objections that are specifically directed at solicitation by organi-
zations, the most important are that it commercializes the practice of law, enables
48 In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
49 See Markus, Group Representation by Attorneys as Misconduct, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1965).
50 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 4
(1964).
51 Comment, 25 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 674, 680 (1958).
52 Id.; Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 306 (1965);
Markus, supra note 49, at 18; Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1630 (1963).
53 Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1632 n. 79 (1963).
54 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
55 Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1632 n. 79 (1963). See Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society, 117
Ohio App. 471, 185 N.E.2d 566, 569 (1962).
56 Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940). Even the American
Bar Association once endorsed the solicitation of a certain class of actions. The A.B.A. Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics approved a plan whereby a committee of lawyers belonging to
the American Liberty League publicly offered legal assistance to persons who felt that their
constitutional rights were being infringed upon by New Deal legislation. A.B.A. Committee
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion No. 148 (1935).
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unscrupulous lawyers to solicit business through such organizations and impairs
the attorney-client relationship.57 However, where the organization has no control
over the fees charged by the recommended attorney nor the course of the litigation,
it cannot be convincingly contended that the profession is being commercialized
nor that the attorney-client relationship is being infringed upon. The charge that
unscrupulous lawyers solicit business through such organizations is relevant only
to the extent that it raises the problem of advertisements in the organizations'
publications naming the recommended attorney. This has been condemned by most
courts confronted with this practice.58 The Supreme Court was silent on this aspect
of the Brotherhood's plan, as was the Illinois Supreme Court.59 Whether the Su-
preme Court's approval of the right to advise and recommend encompasses listing
the recommended counsel by name in organization publications is questionable.
One commentator suggests that "the organization publish only the availability
of competent counsel without identifying that attorney in mass mailings or other
mass communication media."60 Presumably, the name of the specific attorney would
be divulged to the members by more informal means or only when they are in
need of an attorney. In view of the fact that insurance companies are allowed
to name a specific attorney in an insurance policy as the one to be notified in
the event of an accident,61 the solution suggested above might be thought overly
conservative. Nevertheless, it may be prudent in view of the prevailing judicial
attitude.
The Supreme Court decision only gave a nonprofit organization, a labor union,
the right to advise its members to see an attorney before settling claims arising
under a federal statute and to recommend a specific lawyer. Yet the tenor of
the Supreme Court's opinion indicated that in future cases the Court will continue
to be sympathetic to the efforts organizations make to aid their members in obtaining
the services of competent attorneys in bringing actions in areas of interest to the
entire organization.6 2 It is extremely doubtful that the right of an organization
to advise and recommend will be limited to instances in which the rights to be
enforced arise under federal law.63 The nature of the organizations to which this
right will be extended is in doubt although it is contended that the grounds on
which the Supreme Court decision is based will readily support an extension
of this right even to profit-making organizations.64 In any event, the Supreme
Court will be called upon again in the near future to establish guidelines as to
what type of organization possesses the right to advise and recommend and as to
the specific modes of exercising this right without engaging in the "solicitation of
legal business." The only meaningful decision will be one which resists the tra-
ditional impulse to speak of "solicitation" only in generalities and instead pares
away the outdated features of this doctrine. The profession must be presented
with a new doctrine of solicitation which speaks in terms of specific activities and
57 Markus, supra note 49, at 3.
58 In re Maclub, 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936). See People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935); Re Committee on Rule 28 of
the Cleveland Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106, 108 (App. 1933); Association of the Bar of the
City of New York Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions No. 763 (formerly B163)
(1951) & 799 (1955). But see In re Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N.E.2d 749 (1936).
59 In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 IUl.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
60 Markus, supra note 49, at 22.
61 A.B.A. Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion No. 174 (1937).
62 See 377 U.S. at 7, where the Court states that "it is interesting to note that in Great
Britain unions do not simply recommend lawyers to members in need of advice; they retain
counsel, paid by the union, to represent members in personal lawsuits, a practice similar to that
which we upheld in NAACP v. Button.". Perhaps the Court is hinting that it may allow Amer-
ican unions to go this far in the future.
63 See Markus, supra note 49, at 21.
64 Ibid.
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is designed to meet the special problems and needs of the bar and of the public in
the latter half of the twentieth century.
Stephen A. Seall
CIVIL RIGHTS - DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT - ORDIER TO HmE
WITHIN DIsCRETION OF STATE BOARD AGAINST DISCRIMINATION. - Geraldine
Arnett, a 23 year old Negro high school graduate, sought employment as a tray
girl in the dietary department of the Seattle General Hospital. Having been
advised in a telephone conversation with the department that applications were
being taken for that position, Mrs. Arnett appeared at the hospital and asked
to apply. There she was told that applications were not being taken and she was
turned away. That same afternoon, at Mrs. Arnett's request, a friend called the
dietary department to ask whether there were any openings for a tray girl. She
was told that there may be and that applications were being taken. The Wash-
ington State Board Against Discrimination discovered that although Negroes
were hired in other departments, the dietary department had not hired a Negro
during the twelve year tenure of the present supervisor. Therefore, it found that
the hospital had discriminated against Mrs. Arnett in violation of the Washing-
ington Fair Employment Practices Act,1 and, as part of its order, required the
hospital to offer Mrs. Arnett employment at the first opening provided she met
"standard qualifications."'2 On appeal by the hospital, the Superior Court for
King County modified the order so that the hospital had only to give Mrs. Arnett
"full consideration" without regard to race, creed, color or national origin and
then to hire the "best qualified person." s The Board appealed from this modifi-
cation of its order to the Supreme Court of Washington, which held, in a split
decision, that the Board was within its discretion in issuing the original order to
hire and that the King County Court erred in substituting its judgment for that
of the Board. Arnett v. Seattle General Hospital, 395 P.2d 503 (Wash. 1964).
Administrative agencies generally have broad discretion in issuing remedial
orders within the scope of their enabling statutes, and their decisions are upheld
unless it is found that they exceeded their powers or that they acted arbitrarily and
capriciously.4 The majority in Arnett rested its opinion on this principle of wide
administrative discretion,5 while the dissent arguing that the Board's original order
was illegal in that it was "in itself discriminatory" stated: "The purpose of the law
against discrimination is to eliminate racial prejudice and establish equality among
all persons seeking the same employment, to the end that the most qualified person
will be employed, whether Caucasian or non-Caucasian." 6 Arnett, then, presents the
separable problems of the constitutionality and the advisability of the order to hire.
1 WASH. REv. CODE 49.60.030 (1962).
2 Arnett v. Seattle Gen. Hosp., 395 P.2d 503, 504 (Wash. 1964) quoting the order of
the Washington State Board Against Discrimination:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Seattle General Hospital will
accept a written application for employment from Complainant and will
offer her employment in the Dietary Department in the first vacancy of ajob for which she has applied, provided she meets the standard qualifica-
tions of other applicants for employment, but without regard to race, color,
creed or national origin.
3 Id. at 505 quoting the order as modified by the King County Court:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mrs. Arnett will be sent an applica-
tion, and if it is completed and furnished to the hospital, she, when a
vacancy occurs in the position sought, will be given full consideration for
the vacant position and the appointment will be made to the best qualified
person without any consideration to race, creed, color or national origin.
4 4 DAvis, ADmINISTRATIw LAw § 30.10. E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941); Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 58 (1954).
5 395 P.2d 503, 507 (Wash. 1964).
6 Id. at 508.
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Twenty-five states have laws forbidding discrimination in employment. 7 At
least fourteen s of these have provisions specifically including the word "hiring" in
the arsenal of remedies delegated to the Fair Employment Practices agencies in their
discretion in carrying out the letter and policy of the Fair Employment Practices
statutes. Washington's statute is typical in providing that the agency (Washington
State Board Against Discrimination), upon its finding of an unfair practice, issue
an order:
requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unfair practice
and to take such affirmative action, including, (but not limited to) hiring,
reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, an
admission or restoration to full membership rights in any respondent organ-
ization, to take such other action as, in the judgment of the tribunal, will
effectuate the purposes of this chapter. . ..
The order to hire has had, and does have, its practical difficulties in the
states with Fair Employment Practices laws. The order is probably more appropriate
where discrimination is unmistakable and an available applicant is qualified for
an available position than where discrimination is not clearly found, where the appli-
cant has found other employment or is not qualified, or where the position has been
filled.10 The New York Commission for Human Rights, the agency which enforces
the nation's oldest Fair Employment Practices law (enacted in 1945), 11 is prob-
ably most familiar with these remedial difficulties. The General Counsel for that
Commission, Henry Spitz, has written that the Commission often limits its order to
one requiring the discriminating employer to "consider" the applicant without
regard to race, color, creed, religion, or national origin, an order very similar
to the modified order made by the King County Court in Arnett. The reason given
for the Commission's self-imposed restraint is to ensure that persons of inferior
efficiency are not forced upon employers .2
That strong and positive measures 3 are needed to eliminate the sometimes
striking adverse effects' 4 of discrimination cannot be denied. The order to hire is
7 Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. For cita-
tions see: Wll, Labor Looks at Equal Rights in Employment, 24 FED. B.J. 93, 94 n. 8
(1964).
8 CAL. LAB. Conn § 1426, CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-24-7 (Supp. 1960); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 31-127 (1958); HAwArI REV. LAWS § 90A-6 (Supp. 1963); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1005 (Supp. 1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5 (1957); Micr.
Comp. LAws § 423.307 (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-17 (Supp. 1964); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59-4-10 (1953); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAWS § 297; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.05 (Page 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 959 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-24
(1956); WAsH. REv. CODE § 49.60.250 (1962).
9 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.250 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
10 Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation, 74 HAav. L. REV. 526, 553-54 (1961).
11 Minsky, FEPC Comes to Illinois, 50 ILL. B.J. 42 (1961).
12 Spitz, Tailoring the Techniques to Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimination,
14 BUFF. L.J. 79, 84 (1964):
An employer is always entitled to consider an applicant's qualifications
and competency. Thus the temporary State Commission Against Discrimi-
nation, which drafted the Law, stated in its report:
.Often employers fear that they may be compelled to employ, or retain
in employment, persons of inferior efficiency. The administrative body con-
templated by the Commission will have no charter to protect the inefficient
or unfitted in jobs they are incapable of handling." Therefore the Commis-
sion often limits its requirement of the respondent to a consideration of the
complainant for training, union membership or employment without regard
to race, color, creed, religion or national origin.
13 See Pollit, Racial Discrimination in Employment; Proposals for Corrective Action, '13
BUFF. L.J. 59 (1963).
14 See, e.g., Donahue, Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 Fan. B.J. 76, 77 (1964):
"And most striking of all, the non-white college graduate will earn less than a white who has
completed elementary school."
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probably among the strongest of the corrective measures aimed against discrimi-
nation in employment since it involves a coerced employer-employee relationship.
Some writers believe that the order to hire, among other measures, tips and scales
too much against the employer and that an infringement on the traditional right
to freedom of choice15 and "discrimination in reverse!"' 6 are the results; others
stress that liberal use of the order to hire is essential in eliminating employment dis-
crimination.
17
A consideration of the recent Illinois case, In the Matter of Myart and Motor-
ola,'5 may serve to clarify and emphasize some of the difficulties involved in the
use of the order to hire. In that case, the Fair Employment Practices Commission
found that a Negro applicant was deliberately and discriminatorily given a failing
score on an objective test, which the company had destroyed prior to hearing. It
was found, from evidence showing that the applicant had passed the same test
both before and after taking it for Motorola, that the applicant had passed
Motorola's test. The hearing examiner ordered Motorola to hire the applicant;
however, the full Commission on review, upon hearing evidence developed after
the complaint proceeding had been initiated that the applicant had an unfavor-
able background of arrests, vacated the order to hire in favor of an award to
the applicant of $1,000 "as compensatory damages" for Motorola's "act of dis-
crimination."'19 The Commission stated that its reason for vacating the ex-
aminer's order to hire in favor of the $1,000 award was that, having no way of
judging the merit and qualifications of the applicant, the Commission could
not "apply its general remedial policy of placing the Complainant in the same
position in regard to the Respondent as if no act of discrimination had been
committed." 20 The $1,000 award has since been set aside by an Illinois Circuit
Court as beyond the authority of the Commission.2' It is probable that the case
will be appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Motorola decision, as it stands at this writing, has found an employer
guilty of a discriminatory practice but has left the applicant, against whom the
discrimination was aimed and who is perhaps not a "fit" person to be hired be-
cause of his background of arrests, without redress. The case demonstrates the
questionable usefulness of the order to hire since any one of innumerable factors
in an applicant's background may make him "unfit" for employment or at least
an "unfit" subject of an order to hire.
The 1964 Federal Civil Rights Law deals with Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities in Subchapter VI.22 This law provides that an Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission is to be created which only has the power to make investiga-
tions and recommendations. However, it can "refer matters to the Attorney General
with recommendations for intervention in a civil action brought by an aggrieved
party .... ,23 If a proscribed unfair employment practice occurs in a state with a
Fair Employment Practices Act, the state is first given the opportunity to resolve
the matter before the federal machinery goes into operation.2 4 If there is no
state Fair Employment Practices law or if the state machinery fails to resolve
the dispute successfully, then the federal Commission may exercise its powers.2 5
Though the Commission may not issue orders, an aggrieved party may bring
15 Avins, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an Infringement on Freedom of Choice, 6
N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960).
16 Tower, F.E.P.C.--Some Practical Considerations, 24 FED. B.J. 87, 91 (1964).
17 E.g., RUCHAMES, RAcE, JOBS AND POLITICS 174 (1963).
18 Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, Charge No. 63C-127 (Nov. 18, 1964).
19 Id. at 7 (as modified by order, Jan. 12, 1965).
20 Id. at 6.
21 Chicaeo Sun-Times, March 6, 1965, p. 5, col. 1.
22 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 e-15 (1964).
23 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 e-4 (1964).
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 e-5(b, c) (1964).
25 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 e-5 (d) (1964).
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an action in a federal district court which, if it finds that a respondent has com-
mitted an act of discrimination proscribed by the Act, "may enjoin the respondentfrom engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate which may include reinstatement or hiring of em-ployees, with of without back pay." There is a limiting proviso: "No order of
the court shall require. .. the hiring . .. of an individual as an employee . . .if such individual . . . was refused employment . . . for any reason other thandiscrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 26 Thelegislative history of this law makes it clear that an employer is to have the right
to hire the best man 2 7 A memorandum of the Justice Department stated:No employer is required to hire an individual because that individualis a Negro. No employer is required to maintain any ratio of Negroes to
whites, Jews to gentiles, Italians to English, or women to men.... On the
contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a given balance would almost
certainly run afoul of title VII [Subchapter VI] because it would involve afailure or refusal to hire some individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.23
The federal law, while giving the courts the power to order an employer to hire
an individual found to have been the subject of discrimination, is very careful
not to infringe on an employer's right to refuse employment for any other reason.The difficulty lies in the ascertainment and evaluation of these reasons. Anotherdifficulty might be found where, as in Motorola, after the employer has "discrimi-
nated," facts unknown to the employer are discovered in the complaint proceedings
which indicate the applicant's unfitness for employment. The federal law does not
state that the order to hire is inapproriate in such a situation, although clearlyit is; its appropriateness is left to the tribunal's discretion. Abuse of this discretion
could meet with constitutional objections.
It is well settled that freedom of contract is not an absolute right; it is the
subject of regulation and restriction by the state under its valid police powers.2 9The Justice Department, in an opinion written. for Senator Clark, stated: "It is
now clear that appropriate regulation of the hire and discharge of employeesis not an unconstitutional abridgement of the contract right."30 The JusticeDepartment cited a United States Supreme Court decision to illustrate that it
was within the power of the National Labor Relations Board to order an em-ployer, found to have discriminated against two applicants because of union ac-
tivities, to hire those applicants.3' Further, the Department cited another decisionin which the Supreme Court used this strong language: "Race discriminationby an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair and less excusable thandiscrimination against workers on the ground of union affiliation.13 2 It would
seem, from an examination of the reasoning in these decisions, that an orderto hire made pursuant to the enforcement of legislation aimed at prevention
of discrimination based on race, religion, color, creed, or national origin is con-
stitutionally sound. Other United States Supreme Court cases involving reinstate-
ment orders33 and orders of unions to admit specific applicants to membership 4
could be recited to establish the constitutionality of the order to hire.
26 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 e-5 (g) (1964). (Emphasis added.)27 See, e.g., 110 CoNO. REc. 6982-7006 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).28 110 CoNo. REc. 6986 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
29 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).30 110 CoNo. REc. 6989 (daily ed. April 8, 1964) citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).31 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 30.32 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938).33 E.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Texas & New Orleans R. Co.
v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).34 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945):
We have here a prohibition of discrimination in membership or unionservices on account of race, creed or color. A judicial determination that
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In Associated Press v. NLRB35 the constitutional limits of such an
order were discussed by the Supreme Court in considering an order to reinstate.
The Court stated that the order does not at all infringe upon an employer's
right to discharge for any proper reason. Moreover, any law that would impose
a certain percentage or number of employees of any race on an employer would
violate the equal protection clause.3 6 It is not likely that, where a position is
available and an applicant is available and qualified, an order to hire based upon
a clear finding of an employer's discrimination will reach or exceed these con-
stitutional limits. The purpose of Fair Employment Practices laws is not to force
unfit employees on employers, but rather to promote unbiased employer judg-
ment of applicants based upon qualifications alone.87
Arnett v. Seattle General Hospital presents a good example of the difficulties
involved in the order to hire. Used properly, it is a constitutionally sound admin-
istrative and judicial remedy against employment discrimination. However, the
employer's right to freedom of choice must be balanced against the applicant's
right not to be discriminated against for reasons of race, creed, color, or national
origin. The order to hire seems to be an appropriate remedy only when certain
variables exist in combination, that is where the employer's discrimination is
clearly found, where discrimination is the only reason for refusal to hire, where
the position is available, where the applicant remains available for the position,
and where the applicant is fit for the position sought. In Arnett, the Washington
Board clearly found discrimination on the part of the hospital. It was not clear,
however, that the hospital's discrimination was the only reason for the refusal
to hire, or, in this case, for refusal to accept Mrs. Amett's application, since it
appears that there was no immediate opening for the position of tray girl. The
Board's order reflects this fact in requiring the hospital to offer Mrs. Arnett em-
ployment at the first opening. If there was no immediate opening for the position
of tray girl, then it is possible that a long period of time could pass without an
opening appearing. This would leave Mrs. Arnett without a job or income for
all of that period unless she found another job. If she did, then she would be-
come unavailable, thereby making the order to hire inappropriate for that reason.
The Board's order to hire was qualified by the requirement that Mrs. Arnett
meet "standard qualifications of other applicants." Though, admittedly, standards
of fitness for a tray girl are not stringent, the Board's order would have the hospital
hire Mrs. Arnett even though an exceptional and experienced tray girl may have
applied prior to or subsequent to Mrs. Arnett's attempted application. It is sug-
gested, in light of the foregoing, that the order to hire in Arnett v. Seattle General
Hospital was neither an appropriate nor an effective remedy for the hospital's
discrimination.
The order to hire, generally, it is submitted, is rarely appropriate and ef-
fective. The probability of all of the necessary variables being present in a given
situation is not great. A notable instance of the inappropriateness of the order
to hire was the Motorola case, discussed above, where all of the necessary variables
coincided but one, the fitness of the applicant. Even where the order is deemed
appropriate it may not be effective because of the relationship forced upon an
unwilling employer with an unwanted employee. Such an employer could con-
ceivably, without clearly discriminating, make working conditions unpleasant or
even unbearable for his new employee and could, again without clearly discrimi-
nating, enforce working rules strictly so as to discharge such employee for any
such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be a distortion
of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent
state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race
and color.
35 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937).
36 See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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minor infraction. These considerations, taken together with the necessarily inexpert
non-employer determination of fitness for employment involved in the order to
hire, lead this writer to the conclusion that the order to hire should be a remedy
sparingly used by the courts and the state boards.
To the degree this evaluation of the remedy's utility is based upon a repug-
nance for the forced employer-employee relationship, it may be countered that
the argument proves too much. To be sure, the compelled employment may result
in inefficiency or harassment because of the unavoidable fact of compulsion, but
the remedial legislation presupposes and is in fact designed to operate upon the
unwilling employer. If the legislation is to achieve its purpose necessarily there
will be involuntary hiring to some degree. Since the discrimination is undif-
ferentiated, the employer will be just as unwilling to hire the next Negro appli-
cant for the tray girl position as she was reluctant to hire Mrs. Arnett. Moreover,
since racial discrimination is based upon erroneous presuppositions about Negroes
as a class. the order to hire Mrs. Arnett compels an encounter with individual re-
ality that tends to erode those presuppositions.
The difficulty with this defense of the order to hire lies in the fact that there
is a difference between the employer's unwillingness to hire a Mrs. Arnett, who
has been a complaining witness, and his unwillingness to hire the next qualified
Negro applicant. Mrs. Arnett would begin work with two strikes against her
instead of one. Anticipating this result, it would be more effective to award
significant money damages to Mrs. Arnett and thus allow other Negro applicants
to reap the benefit of her protest. Assuming the award does have the deterrent
effect intended, the employer will thereafter hire qualified Negro applicants without
an acrimonious initial confrontation. Thus, considering both the appropriateness and
the effectiveness of the remedy, the order to hire should infrequently be used.
Thomas D. Ready
